Abstract-The broadcast nature of the wireless medium allows unintended users to eavesdrop on confidential information transmission. In this regard, we investigate the problem of secure communication between a source and a destination via a wireless energy harvesting untrusted node that acts as a helper to relay the information; however, the source and destination nodes wish to keep the information confidential from the relay node. To realize the positive secrecy rate, we use destination-assisted jamming. Being an energy-starved node, the untrusted relay harvests energy from the received radio-frequency (RF) signals, which include the source's information signal and the destination's jamming signal. Thus, we utilize the jamming signal efficiently by leveraging it as a useful energy source. At the relay, to enable energy harvesting and information processing, we adopt power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS) policies. To evaluate the secrecy performance of this proposed scenario, we derive analytical expressions for two important metrics, viz., the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate. The numerical analysis reveals design insights into the effects of different system parameters such as PS ratio, energy harvesting time, target secrecy rate, transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), relay location, and energy conversion efficiency factor, on secrecy performance. Specifically, the PS policy achieves better optimal secrecy outage probability and optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the TS policy at higher target secrecy rate and transmit SNR, respectively. Index Terms-Destination-assisted jamming, ergodic secrecy rate, secrecy outage probability, untrusted relay, wireless energy harvesting.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Wireless Energy Harvesting and Cooperative Relaying
E
NERGY harvesting is a popular source of energy to power wireless devices [1] - [3] . It holds the potential to prolong the lifetime of energy-constrained nodes and simultaneously avoids the frequent recharging and replacement of batteries, which otherwise would be inconvenient or unacceptable (e.g., medical devices implanted inside a human body). In addition to harvesting energy from natural sources such as solar, thermal, and wind, the radio-frequency (RF) signals in the surrounding wireless environment is a viable source of energy. In [4] - [6] , exploiting that RF signals can carry both energy and information together, the simultaneous wireless energy harvesting rights to access information [27] . Moreover, if the relay belongs to a different network, it may not have the privilege of accessing the information as that of the source and the destination [28] - [31] . One practical scenario is the heterogeneous networks, where different network entities such as macrocell, microcell, picocell, and femtocell coexist together in the same geographical area and the information communication between two nodes of the same network happens via a node belonging to a different network. In this case, the relaying node, being from the different network, may be considered to be untrusted. Another application scenario for the untrusted relay is the one where the relaying node is compromised [32] . For example, in a hostile region such as a battlefield, an intermediate node relaying the confidential information between the users of a war party can be compromised by the enemy. Considering this possibility, it is important to shield the confidential information from the relaying node to prevent its leakage to the enemy.
In [27] , it was shown that even the communication via an untrusted relay can be beneficial for the relay channel with orthogonal components. In [33] and [34] , it was shown that the positive secrecy rate is achievable with the destinationassisted jamming, where the destination sends jamming signals during the source-relay communication. In [28] - [30] and [35] - [37] , the information-theoretic security performance for amplify-and-forward (AF) relays under the fading channel and destination-assisted jamming were investigated. In [31] , the secrecy outage probability performance of the communication via an untrusted multiantenna relay was studied. In [38] , the use of friendly jammers to secure the communication via an untrusted relay was advocated. To achieve secure and spectral efficient communication, link adaptation and relay assignment were proposed in [39] . In [40] , capacity scaling and diversity order for secure relaying were studied with distributed beamforming and opportunistic relaying. In [41] , the secure relayassisted communication was examined, where legitimate users, rather considering the relay completely untrusted, have a degree of trust about the relay.
C. Wireless Energy Harvesting With Physical-Layer Security
Recently, with wireless energy harvesting, a few works have studied the physical-layer security in the presence of external eavesdroppers for different scenarios such as point-to-point communication with a single antenna [42] , [43] and multiple antennas [44] - [47] , and the cooperative communication via a relay [48] - [51] . In [48] , in the presence of the external energy harvesting receiver, the secure relay beamforming with simultaneous wireless information and energy transfer was studied. In [49] , the secrecy performance for an AF relay wiretap channel was investigated when the external helpers, who act as jammers to the eavesdropper, harvest energy from the source's transmission. In the presence of an external eavesdropper, in [50] , the secure communication between a source and a destination via multiple energy harvesting relays was studied, whereas in [51] , the secrecy performance of the source-destination communication via an energy harvesting relay with multiple antennas was investigated. However, in [48] - [51] , the relay was assumed to be trusted, and external eavesdroppers attempted to intercept the relay-assisted communication between the source and the destination. Moreover, the studies on untrusted relay, until now, have assumed that the conventional energy source, such as a battery, powers the relay (see, e.g., [26] - [31] , [33] - [36] , and [38] - [41] ).
In this paper, we address the problem of secure communication via an energy harvesting untrusted relay. When an untrusted relay harvests energy from the received RF signals, the jamming signal can act as a potential energy source in addition to its original purpose of realizing the secure communication via untrusted relay. This allows us to use the jamming signal efficiently.
D. Contributions and Key Results
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of a two-hop communication between a source and a destination, where the source uses an AF wireless energy harvesting untrusted relay to forward the confidential information to the legitimate destination. To keep the information secret from the relay, we consider the destination-assisted jamming. The relay harvests energy from received RF signals, which include the information signal from the source and the jamming signal from the destination. We use PS and TS receiver architectures [6] at the relay to facilitate the energy harvesting and information processing. We summarize the main contributions and key results in the following.
• With the jamming signal leveraged as a useful energy source under both PS and TS policies, for an energy harvesting AF relay, we derive analytical expressions for two important measures of secrecy performance-the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate.
• We further compare PS and TS policies, where we show that, at higher target secrecy rate and transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), PS policy achieves lower secrecy outage probability and higher ergodic secrecy rate, respectively.
• The numerical results also show that the PS ratio in the PS policy and energy harvesting time in the TS policy have both constructive and destructive effects on the secure communication between source and destination. Thus, the optimal PS ratio in the PS policy and the optimal energy harvesting time in the TS policy that maximizes the secrecy performance do exist. • For both PS and TS policies, the numerical analysis shows that, the optimal secrecy performance is achieved when the relay is located closer to the destination than to the source. This is in contrast with the case where the wireless energy harvesting relay is considered trusted, and the optimum location of the relay is closer to the source.
E. Organization of This Paper
We structure the remainder of this paper as follows. Section II describes the system model for the two-hop secure communication via an energy harvesting untrusted relay using the destination-assisted jamming. In Sections III and IV, utilizing the jamming signal as a useful energy source, we derive analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate for the PS-policy and TS-policy-based relaying. We present numerical results in Section V, where we discuss the effects of different system parameters on the secrecy performance of the relay-assisted communication and obtain various design insights. Finally, we provide concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Destination-Assisted Jamming and Channel Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , a source S communicates with a destination D via an AF energy harvesting relay R. Despite relay's information cooperation, the source and destination nodes wish to keep the information secret from the relay. To maintain the confidentiality of the source information, the destination sends a jamming signal to the relay when source transmits the information to the relay. Each node operates in a halfduplex mode and has a single antenna. The direct link between S and D is unavailable. 1 Let us denote the coefficient of the channel between nodes i and j by h ij . We consider a quasistatic block-fading Rayleigh channel between two nodes, as in [8] , [12] , [28] , [35] . That is, the channel remains constant over slot duration of T , during which S transmits to D via R. The channel power gain is given by |h ij | 2 , which has exponential distribution with mean λ ij , i.e.,
where
is the probability density function of random variable |h ij | 2 . We assume the channel between R and D is reciprocal, as in [28] , [29] , [31] , [35] , and [36] , i.e., h RD = h DR . In this paper, the source is assumed to have no channel state information (CSI), whereas the CSI of S−R and R−D channels are available at the relay and destination, respectively [8] - [10] .
B. Energy Harvesting and Information Processing Model
The untrusted relay harvests energy from the received RF signals, which it uses to forward the source's information to the destination. To activate the energy harvesting circuitry at the relay, the received power must exceed the minimum threshold power θ H [3] , [52] , [53] . 2 We assume that the relay has no other energy source and uses the harvested energy completely for the transmission as the power consumed by the relay's transmit/receive circuitry is negligible compared with the power required for the transmission [8] , [12] . We adopt the following two different receiver-architecture-based policies at the relay to separately harvest energy from the received RF signals and process the information [7] . 1) PS policy: The relay uses a part of the received power to harvest the energy and the remaining part for the information processing. 2) TS policy: The relay switches between the energy harvesting and the information processing. That is, the relay uses a fraction of the time of a slot to harvest the energy and the remaining time for the information processing and relaying. Note that the relay may attempt to decode the source information with the power used for the information processing.
III. POWER-SPLITTING-POLICY-BASED RELAYING Fig. 2 shows the PS-policy-based relaying protocol, where the source-to-destination communication happens in a slot of duration T . Two phases of equal duration T /2 divide the slot. In the first phase, the source transmits information to the relay with power P S . At the same time, the destination sends a jamming signal with power P D to the relay to maintain the confidentiality of the source information from the relay. The relay uses a fraction β of the received power for energy harvesting and the remaining (1 − β) portion for information processing, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. Using the harvested energy, in the second phase, the relay forwards the received information to destination after amplification.
A. Energy Harvesting at Relay
In the aforementioned PS policy, the relay harvests energy E H , which is given as
where η is the energy conversion efficiency factor with 0 < η ≤ 1, which is dependent on the energy harvesting circuitry of the relay. The terms P S |h SR | 2 and P D |h DR | 2 in (2) denote the power received at the relay due to the information signal from the source and the jamming signal from the destination, respectively. In the second phase of duration T /2, the relay's transmit power to forward the information to destination is given as
B. Information Processing and Relaying Protocol
In phase one, the received signal y R for the information processing at the relay is given by
where x S is the source message with unit power, x D is the unit power jamming signal sent by the destination, and n R is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay. We assume that the PS does not affect the noise power [11] , [54] . Based on the received signal y R in (4), the relay may attempt to decode the source message x S . We can write SNR at the relay as
where N 0 is the noise power of AWGN n R . In phase two, the relay amplifies the received signal y R by a factor ξ based on its power constraint and forwards the resultant signal x R to the destination, which is given as
Then, we substitute (4) in (6) and then use (6) to write the received signal y D at the destination as
where n D is the AWGN at the destination with power N 0 . Since x D is the jamming signal sent by the destination itself to the relay in phase one, the destination can remove the term (8) and decode the source information from the rest of the received signal. 3 Thus, the resultant received signal y D at the destination becomes
3 In the case of channel estimation errors, the destination will have inaccurate knowledge of the channel gain on the relay-destination link, and because of this, it will not be able to cancel the jamming signal completely, causing self-interference. This, in turn, will reduce the received SNR at the destination, deteriorating the secrecy performance. Given that the scope of this paper is to analyze the untrusted nature of an energy harvesting relay on the source-relay-destination communication, we restrict ourselves to study the secrecy performance without channel estimation errors.
Finally, substituting P H from (3) in (7) and then using ξ from (7) in (9), we get
The first term on the right-hand side of (10) represents the signal part, whereas the second and third terms correspond to the total received noise at the destination. Then, the SNR at the destination can be written as
C. Secure Communication via an Untrusted Relay
When the relay is considered untrusted, we can write the instantaneous secrecy rate R sec of the relay-assisted communication as [55] 
where [x] + = max(x, 0). The factor 1/2 represents the effective communication time between the source and the destination. For the remainder of Section III, we assume P S = P D = P for analytical tractability.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability:
The secrecy outage probability is an important measure of the secrecy performance. It allows us to determine the probability of attaining a target secrecy rate. Given the energy harvesting circuitry of the relay is active, we can express the secrecy outage probability as [55] P out = P (R sec < R th )
where P(·) denotes the probability, R sec is the instantaneous secrecy rate given by (12) , and R th is the target secrecy rate. Then, substituting γ R from (5) and γ D from (11), we can rewrite (13) as
We can further express the secrecy outage probability in (14) analytically as given in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The secrecy outage probability for the PS policy can be approximately expressed as
where δ = 2 2R th , with
Proof: See Appendix A. Equation (15) is obtained using the high SNR approximation of the received SNR at the destination given as
Equation (17) can be obtained from the exact expression given in (11) of γ D by neglecting the term
2 ) (due to negligible N 2 0 at high SNR) from the denominator of (11) . 4 The approximation in (17) is analytically more tractable than the exact expression in (14) . 5 Although the integral in (15) cannot be expressed in a closed form, it can be easily evaluated numerically as the integrand consists of elementary functions.
As stated in Section II-B, the received power at the relay must be greater than the minimum power threshold θ H to activate the energy harvesting circuitry. Using channel reciprocity on the relay-destination link, we can write the received power P R at the relay as
If the received power P R is less than the power threshold θ H , the energy harvesting circuitry at the relay stays inactive, leading to the power outage. The following proposition gives the expression for the power outage probability P(P R < θ H ). Proposition 2: We write the power outage probability P p,out as follows:
where Υ(a, t) = t 0 x a−1 exp(−x)dx is the lower incomplete Gamma function.
Proof: See Appendix B. For an energy constrained untrusted relay, a secrecy outage can also occur if the power received by the relay is insufficient to activate the energy harvesting circuitry [53] . Thus, combining with (15), we can write the overall secrecy outage probability P s out as [53] (20) where P out is given by (15) .
2) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate:
The destinationassisted jamming helps to keep the source information confidential from the relay and achieve the secure communication. In this regard, the probability P pos of achieving strictly positive secrecy rate is an important measure of the secrecy performance. We provide the exact and approximate analytical expression for P pos in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: We write the exact and high SNR approximation analytical expressions for the probability of achieving strictly positive secrecy rate P pos as follows:
, and
θ 2 is the positive root of the equation g(x) = ηβP x 2 −N 0 = 0, whereas θ 3 is the real root of ψ(x) = 0 that is equivalent to a cubic equation given as
3) Ergodic Secrecy Rate: Another important secrecy metric is the ergodic secrecy rate, which is the maximum transmission rate at which the eavesdropper fails to decode the secret information that is being transmitted. We can obtain the ergodic secrecy rate by averaging out the instantaneous secrecy rate R sec over all possible channel realizations. Thus, in the case of untrusted relaying, the ergodic secrecy rate, with the inclusion of power outage probability P p,out given by (19) , can be given as
where E{·} is the expectation operator. Using (5) and (11) in (24), we can write the analytical expression forR sec as
Using high SNR approximation for γ D as given in (17), we can writeR sec as
The expressions in (25) and (26) do not admit a closed form and are intractable. Alternatively, we provide a closed-form lower bound on (26) as given in the following proposition. The lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate ensures the minimum ergodic secrecy rate under all possible channel conditions for a given set of parameters.
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Proposition 4: The ergodic secrecy rateR sec in (26) is lower bounded as
577215 is the Euler's constant [56, 9 .73], 6 Such guarantee of minimum performance is a useful criterion in the design of a secure communication system. and Ei(x) = − ∞ −x (exp(−t)/t)dt is the exponential integral [56, 8.21] .
Proof: See Appendix D. The lower bound given in (27) is tight in the high SNR regime, which is shown in Fig. 8 . Proposition 4 shows that the ergodic secrecy rate depends on the PS factor β, energy conversion efficiency factor η, and mean channel gains of source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links.
IV. TIME-SWITCHING-POLICY-BASED RELAYING Fig. 3 shows TS-policy-based relaying protocol for the secure communication via untrusted relay. The communication between the source and the destination happens over two hops and in a duration of T . The relay harvests energy for αT duration (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) from the received RF signals. The relay spends its harvested energy to forward the received information from the source to the destination. The remaining (1 − α)T duration is further split in two subslots of equal duration of (1 − α)T /2. In the first subslot, the source transmits the information to relay, which is forwarded to the destination in the second subslot after the amplification. The destination sends a jamming signal during the source-to-relay transmission.
A. Energy Harvesting at Relay
For the aforementioned TS policy, the energy E H harvested during αT duration is given by
The relay uses this harvested energy to forward the source information to the destination with power given by
B. Information Processing and Relaying Protocol
After the energy harvesting phase, the relay switches to information processing phase, where the received signal is given by
Note that, unless otherwise stated, all notations here have the same meanings as they have in Section III on the PS-policybased relaying. Using the received signal y R given in (31), the relay may attempt to decode source information. The received SNR at the relay is given by
The relay forwards the amplified version of the received signal to the destination, which is given by
Then, the received signal y D at the destination is given by
After subtracting the term corresponding to the known jamming signal x D , the resultant received signal y D at the destination becomes
Substituting P H from (30) in (33), and then ξ from (33) in (35), we can write the received signal y D as
The first term on the right-hand side of (36) represents the received signal part at the destination, whereas the last two terms represent the overall noise at the destination. Thus, we can write the received SNR at the destination as
For the remainder of Section IV, we assume P S = P D = P for analytical tractability.
C. Secure Communication via an Untrusted Relay
For the proposed TS policy, the instantaneous secrecy rate can be given by
where γ R and γ D are given by (32) and (37), respectively. The factor (1 − α)/2 denotes the effective time of information transmission between source and destination.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability:
We can express the secrecy outage probability as given in the Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: For TS policy, given the energy harvesting circuitry of the relay is active, the secrecy outage probability is analytically given by (15) , where δ = 2 2R th /(1−α) , with
Proof: The proof follows the same steps used in Appendix A to derive the secrecy outage probability for the PS policy in Proposition 1. Thus, we skip the proof for TS policy for brevity.
Note that, for the TS policy, the secrecy outage probability under high SNR approximation as given by (15) is obtained by approximating the exact expression of γ D in (37) as
where we have used the channel reciprocity, i.e., h RD = h DR . We have obtained (41) from the exact expression of received SNR at the destination given in (37) by neglecting the term
in the denominator of (37) due to negligible value of N 2 0 at high SNR. Now, considering the power outage probability, we can finally write the total secrecy outage probability as (20) . Note that the power outage probability for PS and TS policies is the same.
2) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate:
The following proposition gives the analytical expression for P pos . 
Proof: The proof follows the same steps used in Appendix C for the PS policy. We skip the proof for TS policy for brevity.
3) Ergodic Secrecy Rate: With the inclusion of the power outage probability P p,out given in (19) , the ergodic secrecy rate is calculated by averaging the instantaneous secrecy rate over all possible channel realizations and is given as
Using (32) and (37) in (42), we can write the analytical expression forR sec as
Using high SNR approximation for γ D as given in (41), we can writeR sec as
Both (43) and (44) do not admit a closed form. Alternatively, we present a closed-form lower bound on (44) as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 7:
We lower bound the ergodic secrecy rateR sec in (44) bȳ
where T 1 and T 2 are given by (28a) and (28b), respectively, with
The proof follows the same steps used in Appendix D to derive the lower bound on ergodic secrecy capacity for the PS policy in Proposition 4. Thus, we skip the proof for the TS policy for brevity.
The lower bound given in (45) is tight in the high SNR regime, which is shown in Fig. 8 .
V. DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS
Here, we investigate the secrecy performance of source-destination communication via an untrusted wireless energy harvesting relay. We discuss the impact of different system parameters on the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate under both PS and TS policies.
A. System Parameters and Simulation Setup
Unless otherwise stated, we consider the following system parameters. The source power and destination jamming signal power P S = P D = P = 40 dBm, energy conversion efficiency η = 0. Fig. 4 shows the effects of the PS ratio β under the PS policy and the energy harvesting time α under the TS policy on the secrecy outage probability. For the PS policy, with the increase in β, the secrecy outage probability initially decreases to a minimum value. The value of β corresponding to the minimum secrecy outage probability is the optimal value Fig. 4 . Effect of the PS ratio β and the energy harvesting time α for PS and TS policies, respectively, on the secrecy outage probability R th = 0.5 bits/s/Hz. of β. If we increase β further beyond the optimal value, the secrecy outage probability also increases. This is because, as β increases, the relay harvests more energy, which, in turn, increases the relay's transmit power, improving the information reception at the destination. Moreover, the increased β reduces the received signal strength at the relay, which degrades the received SNR γ R at the relay. This enhances the secrecy rate of the communication, which reduces the secrecy outage probability. However, once β crosses the optimal value, the poor signal strength at the relay delivers a negative effect on the secrecy outage probability. Due to the amplification of the poorly received signal, the relay forwards a noisy signal to the destination, which reduces the received SNR γ D at the destination. The increased harvested energy due to the increased β, in turn, the higher transmit power of the relay, cannot compensate for the loss in γ D because of the reduced signal strength. This pushes the secret source-destination communication into the outage more often, increasing the secrecy outage probability. On the similar line, for Fig. 5 , we can explain the initial increase in the ergodic secrecy rate with β and then its fall after the optimal β. Figs. 4 and 5 also show that the simulation results are in excellent agreement with analytical results.
B. Effect of Power Splitting Ratio β and Energy Harvesting Time α
1) Effect of β:
2) Effect of α: Fig. 4 shows that, for the TS policy, as the energy harvesting time α increases, the secrecy outage Fig. 6 . Effect of target secrecy rate on the optimal secrecy outage probability for PS and TS policies.
probability reduces initially and reaches the minimum value for the optimal value of α. However, the secrecy outage probability begins to increase as α increases beyond its optimal value. This is because, as α increases, the relay spends more time on the energy harvesting, which, in turn, increases its transmit power improving the received SNR at the destination. Meanwhile, the increase in α reduces the time available for information processing at both the relay and destination. Now, at the relay, the reduced time for information processing has two opposite effects on the secrecy outage probability. First, it degrades the reception of the signal at the relay and, thus, deteriorates the eavesdropping channel of the relay improving the secrecy outage probability. On the contrary, since the relay amplifies and forwards the received signal to the destination, the reception at the destination also degrades. Now, when α is less than its optimal value and increasing, the positive effects due to the increased harvested energy at the relay and deterioration of the eavesdropping channel are dominant, and the secrecy outage probability reduces. Once α crosses the optimal value, the effect of the reduced time for information processing becomes dominant, increasing the secrecy outage probability. Similarly, for Fig. 5 , we can explain the initial increase in the ergodic secrecy rate with α and then its fall after the optimal α. Fig. 6 plots the optimal secrecy outage probability versus the target secrecy rate R th . As the required secrecy rate constraint becomes tighter, the optimal secrecy outage probability increases. This is because the higher R th is set, the more it becomes difficult to satisfy, and the likelihood of the secure communication between the source and the destination running into the outage increases. Fig. 6 also shows that the TS policy achieves lower secrecy outage probability at low R th (until 0.5 bits/s/Hz) than that of the PS policy. On the contrary, at a higher secrecy rate constraint, the PS policy outperforms the TS policy. Fig. 7 shows the effect of the transmit SNR, i.e., P/N 0 , on the optimal secrecy outage probability for both PS and TS policies. For a fixed noise power N 0 , the variation in transmit SNR is equivalent to the variation of source's and destination's power P . The increase in transmit SNR has its constructive and destructive effects on the secure communication. The increase in the transmit SNR increases the signal strengths of both information signal from the source and jamming signal from the destination. From the expressions of received SNR γ R at the relay given by (5) and (32) for PS and TS policies, respectively, we can note that γ R increases with the increase in transmit SNR. This increases the chances of the untrusted relay decoding the information, which leads to the increase in the secrecy outage probability. On the other hand, the increase in transmit SNR increases the energy harvested by the relay due to higher received power from information and jamming signals. This causes an increase in the relay's transmit power, which improves SNR at the destination. Moreover, when relay amplifies and forwards its received signal to the destination, the signal strength is further improved due to the increased signal strength at the relay as a result of the increased transmit SNR. As Fig. 7 shows, the increase in transmit SNR has an overall positive impact on the secrecy performance of the system.
C. Effect of Target Secrecy Rate R th
D. Effect of Transmit Signal-to-Noise Ratio
Similarly, Fig. 8 shows that the optimal ergodic secrecy rate improves with the increase in transmit SNR. One interesting observation is that, at lower transmit SNR values, the TS policy achieves better optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the PS policy. On the other hand, at higher transmit SNR, the PS policy attains higher ergodic secrecy rate, compared with the TS policy. In Fig. 8 , we can note that, with the increase in transmit SNR, the performance with the closed-form lower bound on the ergodic secrecy rate approaches the performance with the exact analytical expression. Thus, the closed-form lower bound is tight at high transmit SNR for both PS and TS policies. Fig. 9 shows the effect of the relay placement on the optimal secrecy outage probability for different target secrecy rates and path-loss exponents ρ under both PS and TS policies. We vary the source-relay distance d SR , whereas the relay-destination distance d RD is 10 − d SR . The values of path-loss exponent ρ considered are ρ = 2.7 and 4. Before discussing Fig. 9 , it is RD . This saving of energy is important because the energy harvested by the relay decreases with the increase in d SR . Another negative effect of the increased d SR on the secrecy performance is that, due to the AF nature of the relay, as the received signal strength at the relay reduces with the increase in d SR , the information signal strength at the destination also deteriorates. This reduces the secrecy rate and, thus, increases the secrecy outage probability. Fig. 9 shows that the constructive effects of the increase in d SR overtake its destructive effects irrespective of the secrecy Fig. 10 . Effect of relay placement on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate for PS and TS policies with different path-loss exponents ρ = 2.7, 4. rate threshold R th under both PS and TS policies and the optimal secrecy outage probability decreases monotonically with the increase in d SR . Thus, the optimum placement of the relay is closer to the destination. Note that, in the case of wireless energy harvesting communication via a relay without secrecy constraints, the optimum relay placement is close to the source [8] . However, as shown in Figs. 9 and 10, to have secure communication, the relay placement close to the source is not preferred. Fig. 10 shows that, for the optimal ergodic secrecy rate, the relay placement has similar effects on the secrecy performance as that on the optimal secrecy outage probability. One interesting observation is that, with the variation in d SR , there exists a crossover point between PS and TS policies, and the location of the crossover point depends on the path-loss exponent. For example, for the path-loss exponent ρ = 2.7, the TS policy achieves higher optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the PS policy below d SR = 2 m, i.e., the crossover occurs at d SR = 2 m, whereas for ρ = 4, the TS policy achieves higher optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the PS policy below d SR = 8 m, i.e., the crossover occurs at d SR = 8 m. This is because, at a given path-loss exponent, below the crossover point, the loss in information processing time due to the energy harvesting time in the TS policy is lesser than the loss incurred in the relay's transmit power due to PS in the PS policy. As the distance between relay and destination decreases (with the increase in d SR ), the relay may transmit with lower power due to lower path loss. This subsides the loss incurred in PS in the PS policy compared with the loss in time for the TS policy, and the PS policy outperforms the TS policy at higher d SR . The increase in path-loss exponent delays the arrival of the crossover point because, for a higher path-loss exponent, the distance between relay and destination should be lower than that in the case of the lower path-loss exponent to subside the loss incurred in PS. This effect of the path-loss exponent on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate is also shown in Fig. 11 for different source-relay distances. In addition to the effect of the path-loss exponent on the crossover point, Fig. 11 shows that the increase in path-loss exponent is detrimental for secure communication. 12 . Effect of the energy conversion efficiency factor η (a) on the optimal secrecy outage probability and (b) on the optimal ergodic secrecy rate.
E. Effect of Relay Placement
F. Effect of Energy Conversion Efficiency Factor η
The energy conversion efficiency factor η determines what fraction of the received power the relay can actually harvest. Thus, higher η allows relay to harvest more energy, which in turn boosts relay's transmit power. This results in the enhanced received SNR at the destination, reducing the secrecy outage probability and improving the ergodic secrecy rate, as shown in Fig. 12(a) and (b) , respectively. At lower η, the TS policy achieves a better optimal ergodic secrecy rate than that of the PS policy, and the trend reverses at higher η.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated the secrecy performance of the source-destination communication via an energy harvesting AF untrusted relay. The energy-starved relay harvests energy from the received radio-frequency signals. In this case, in addition to keeping the information confidential from the untrusted relay, the destination-assisted jamming signal supplies energy to relay. This energy augments the energy harvested from the received information signal. The PS and TS policies at the relay enable it to harvest energy and process the received information. For this proposed scenario, we have derived analytical expressions for two secrecy metrics, namely, the secrecy outage probability and the ergodic secrecy rate.
The numerical study of the aforementioned secrecy metrics against different system parameters provides useful design insights. For instance, the variation of the PS ratio in the PS policy and energy harvesting time in the TS policy affect the secrecy performance in both constructive and destructive ways. Thus, the optimal PS ratio and the optimal energy harvesting time exist, which maximize the secrecy performance in terms of both secrecy metrics. The optimal values of secrecy metrics depend on the system parameters. For example, the increase in the target secrecy rate increases the optimal secrecy outage probability. Moreover, at a higher target secrecy rate, the PS policy achieves a lower optimal secrecy outage probability than the TS policy. Although the increase in transmit SNR increases the possibility of relay decoding confidential information, the resulting higher harvested energy and the jamming power dominate the negative effect. Thus, the increase in transmit SNR is beneficial to secure communication. The relay location is important in secure communication. In general, having a relay located away from the source is beneficial to keeping the information confidential from the relay. This is in contrast with the case of trusted energy harvesting relay, where the relay is preferred to be placed closer to the source. Finally, a higher energy conversion efficiency factor increases the harvested energy by the relay, which, in turn, improves secrecy performance. APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF (15) At high SNR, using the channel reciprocity between relay and destination and substituting γ R from (5) and γ D from (17) in (12) , and then using (12) and (13), we can write the secrecy outage probability for PS policy as
Based on the sign of ν(X), we split (46) as 
Note that θ 1 is the positive root of the equation ν(x) = 0. Using (49), we can write (48) as
Substituting f X (x) = (1/λ RD ) exp(−(x/λ RD )) in the third integral of (51), we reach the required expression of P out as in (15) .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We can write the power outage probability as P p,out = P(P R < θ H ) = P P |h SR 
Note that Z can take only nonnegative values as it is the sum of two exponential random variables. Using (53) in (52), we can write
Evaluating the integral in (54), we get the required expression for the power outage probability as in (19) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
A. Proof of (21a)
We can write the probability of achieving the positive secrecy capacity as P pos = (1 − P p,out )P(R sec > 0)
Substituting γ R from (5) and γ D from (11) in (55), we obtain
Then, we can write
where . We obtain the solution to (61) using Cardano's formula [58] , which allows us to find the real root of (61). The solution is given as .
Substituting (57) in (55), we get the exact expression of the probability of positive secrecy rate given in (21a).
B. Proof of (21b)
Under high SNR approximation of γ D given in (17), using (55), we can write the probability of the positive secrecy rate as
where we have used γ R from (5) with P S = P D = P and h DR = h RD (channel reciprocity between relay and destination). Simplifying (63), we obtain P pos = (1 − P p,out )P |h RD | 2 > N 0 ηβP
where θ 2 = N 0 /ηβP .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
For the PS policy, we can write the ergodic secrecy rate as 
Substituting (73) in (72) and using [56, 3.353.3] and [56, 3.352 .4], we finally obtain the required expression for T 2 as in (28b).
